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Abstract
Diverse subfields of neuroscience have enriched artificial intelligence for many decades. With
recent advances in machine learning and artificial neural networks, many neuroscientists are
partnering with AI researchers and machine learning experts to analyze data and construct
models. This paper attempts to demonstrate the value of such collaborations by providing
examples of how insights derived from neuroscience research are helping to develop new ma-
chine learning algorithms and artificial neural network architectures. We survey the relevant
neuroscience necessary to appreciate these insights and then describe how we can translate our
current understanding of the relevant neurobiology into algorithmic techniques and architectural
designs. Finally, we characterize some of the major challenges facing current AI technology and
suggest avenues for overcoming these challenges that draw upon research in developmental and
comparative cognitive neuroscience.
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1 Introduction
Artificial neural networks support distributed computations in which concepts are represented as
patterns of activity in the units that comprise the network layers, and inference is carried out
by propagating activation levels between layers weighted by learned connection weights. Artificial
neural networks provide a type of fast, flexible computing well suited to handling ambiguity of
the sort we routinely encounter in real-world environments, and, by doing so, they complement
traditional symbolic computing technologies.
Engineers frequently borrow ideas from nature and generally find it more practical to translate
these ideas into current technology rather than attempt to reproduce nature’s solutions in detail.
Indeed, the basic idea of artificial neural networks has been implemented multiple times using
different technologies in order to approximate the connectivity patterns and signal transmission
characteristics of real neural circuits while largely ignoring the physiology of real neurons in their
implementation.
The human brain supports a wide array of learning and memory systems. Some we have begun
to understand functionally and behaviorally, others we can only hypothesize must exist, and still
others about which we haven’t a clue. Just knowing that the brain supports a particular capability
can serve as an important clue in engineering complex AI systems. Knowing how can lead to
an innovative design, enhanced performance and extended competence. In particular, knowing
something about how specific biological circuits relate to behavior helps in designing novel network
architectures.
We are interested in designing neural network architectures that leverage what is known about
biological information processing to solve complex real-world problems. To focus our efforts, we
have set out to design end-to-end systems that assist human programmers in writing, debugging
and modifying software. We benefit considerably from working closely with scientists from diverse
subdisciplines of neuroscience to seek solutions to specific problems and identify additional problems
we may have overlooked. The following section explains why this commingling of people, ideas and
technologies is so valuable to us in pursuit of our objectives.
2 Neuroscience
From the brain of an Etruscan shrew weighing in at less than a tenth of a gram to a sperm whale brain
weighing more than eight kilograms, it is clear that natural selection has stumbled on a basic brain
plan and set of developmental strategies that enables it to construct a diverse set of special-purpose
brain architectures for efficiently expressing a wide range of sophisticated behavior [57, 182]. The
human brain with its approximately 100 billion neurons and the shrew brain with approximately 1
million neurons share the same basic architecture.
The mouse brain has homologues of most human subcortical nuclei and has contributed signifi-
cantly to our understanding of the human brain and human neurodegenerative disease in particular.
The differences between between human and chimpanzee brains are subtle [129] and yet humans
display a much wider range of behavior and express a much larger repertoire of genes than any
other species [88]. So what makes the difference?
It’s the connections between neurons that matter or, more generally, it’s the different types of
communication between neurons that biologists refer to as pathways. There are electrical, chem-
ical and genetic pathways and each of them obey different constraints and are used for different
purposes. They include point-to-point and broadcast methods of communication [86]. They trans-
fer information at different speeds and using different coding strategies. Layered architectures are
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Figure 1: A highly stylized rendering of the major functional areas of the human cortex shown
from the side with the head facing to right. Highlighted regions include the occipital lobe shown
in shades of green including the primary visual cortex; the parietal lobe shown in shades of blue,
including the primary somatosensory cortex; the temporal lobe shown in shades of yellow including
the primary auditory cortex; and the frontal lobe shown in shades of pink, including the primary
motor and prefrontal cortex. The region outlined by a dashed line on the right is Brocas area and it
is historically associated with the production of speech and hence its position relative to the motor
cortex. The region outlined by a dashed line on the left is Wernickes area and it is historically
associated with the understanding of speech and hence its position relative to the sensory cortex.
common not just in the cortex but throughout the brain. It’s the wiring that sets humans apart.
2.1 Connectivity
Figure 1 shows the major functional areas of the human neocortex including the primary and
secondary sensory and motor areas. The proximal locations of the areas provide a very rough idea
of how different functions might relate to another. The graphic shown belies the fact that the brain
is three dimensional and much of its functional circuitry hidden under the cortical sheet. The human
cerebral cortex is complexly folded to fit within the skull with much of it hidden within the folds.
This folded sheet of tissue accounts for more than 75% of the human brain by volume [170] and is
largely responsible for the rich behavioral repertoire that humans exhibit. It is worth pointing out
in this context that the cortical sheet enshrouds a collection of evolutionarily preserved and highly
specialized circuits homologues of which are found in all mammals and without which the cortex
would be useless.
The graphic shown in Figure 1 is a simplification of the standard medical textbook diagram.
In particular, several of the association areas are not shown and those that are shown are labeled
somewhat differently than is common practice. The organizing biological principle is that, the fur-
ther away from the primary sensory areas, associative functions become more general by integrating
information from multiple modalities to construct abstract representations tailored to serve ecolog-
ically relevant objectives [186]. It is worth contemplating the arrangement of areas to note that
they converge on locations in the cortex that will play an important role in decision making and
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Figure 2: Two 3-D renderings of the human brain generated by the Allen Institute Brain Explorer
from the Allen Human Brain Reference Atlas [89]. The inset shown in the left upper corner of each
panel indicates the orientation of the head. The left panel (A) shows 3-D reconstructions of several
subcortical nuclei featured in this paper. A cross-sectional view of the whole brain is projected
on the mid-sagittal plane dividing the right and left sides of the brain illustrating how the cortex
envelopes the subcortical regions. The right panel (B) shows the same subcortical nuclei as seen
from above (horizontal plane) and to the rear of the brain illustrating how the thalamus is located
between the cortical sheet and the subcortical nuclei serving in its role as a relay between the two
regions.
higher-order cognition more generally.
Figure 2 highlights the 3-D structure of several subcortical nuclei emphasized in this paper
showing how they relate anatomically to one another and to the cortex. The reconstructions were
generated from data generated by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of adult human
subjects [89] and offer additional functional insight complementing conventional histological stud-
ies [31]. They don’t however provide detailed information concerning either local or long-range
connectivity.
Traditionally, tracing connections between individual neurons has been accomplished using a
variety of techniques including conventional histological and staining techniques, electrophysiology,
neurotropic retroviruses and transgenic organisms expressing fluorescent proteins. However, these
methods yield relatively sparse reconstructions and don’t scale well to large tissue samples [10, 34].
Small samples of neural tissue can be fixed, stained and sliced into thin sections. Each of the
sections is then scanned with an electron microscope and the resulting digital images analyzed with
computer vision software to reconstruct neurons and identify synapses [124]. The process is time
consuming but can be fully automated and scaled to handle larger samples [94, 189].
It is also possible to reconstruct the major white matter tracts formed by bundles of myelinated
fibers using diffusion-weighted fMRI and averaging over multiple subjects after registering the indi-
vidual brain scans with a reference atlas [134, 176]. Unlike the previous technologies, this method
is not destructive so it can be applied to human subjects and accuracy is improved by averaging
over multiple subjects after registering the individual brain scans with a reference atlas
These major tracts increase the speed of signal transmission between regions allowing for more
distant communication in larger brains. The differences between the neocortex in humans and
chimpanzees are subtle [129]; however, white matter connections observed in humans but not in
chimpanzees particularly link multimodal areas of the temporal, lateral parietal, and inferior frontal
3
Figure 3: White matter tracts corresponding to bundles of myelinated neurons speed the transmis-
sion of information between distant regions of the brain. The left panel (A) shows the connections
between the prefrontal cortex and circuits in the parietal and temporal cortex that shape conscious
awareness, guide attention and support short-term memory maintenance [39, 49]. The parietal
and temporal cortices are known for being home to association areas that integrate information
from multiple sensory systems thereby creating rich representations necessary for abstract thinking.
In humans, white matter tracts between the frontal cortex and the cerebellum — shown in the
right panel (B) — facilitate higher-order cognitive function in addition to their role in supporting
motor function in all mammals. For example, these connections are particularly important in the
development of reading skills in children and adolescents [172, 106].
cortices, including tracts important for language processing [9, 76].
The cerebellum in mammals serves to shape motor activities selected in the basal ganglia by
ensuring they are precisely timed and well-coordinated. Such activities are initiated by the basal
ganglia with executive oversight from the prefrontal cortex. In humans, the cerebellum also supports
cognitive functions such as those involved in reading [172]. Figure 3 (B) shows the white matter
tracts connecting the cerebellum and prefrontal cortex where such abstract cognitive functions
originate.
A white matter bundle called the arcuate fasciculus — Figure 3 (A) — provides reciprocal
connections between the frontal cortex and association areas in the parietal and temporal lobes
plays a key role in attention and the active maintenance of short-term working memory, including
support for language processing in the left hemisphere and visuospatial processing in the right
hemisphere [39].
The human brain exhibits structure at many scales, the white matter tracts being but one
example. A common pattern involves paths that connect multiple circuits that have their own
internal components and connections. At a global scale, processing begins in primary sensory areas,
propagates forward through dorsal regions integrating additional sources of information to produce
composite representations that are processed in the frontal cortex before returning through ventral
regions responsible for motivation and action selection.
2.2 Reciprocity
Many of the connections within such paths are reciprocal allowing feedback to adjust behavior and
improve prediction. Similar reflective and self-corrective patterns arise within subcortical regions
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Figure 4: The left panel (A) illustrates the reciprocal connections between two subnuclei of the
basal ganglia, the putamen and caudate nucleus, and locations in prefrontal cortex responsible for
influencing action selection. The distinctions between frontal, parietal and temporal cortical areas
provide only a very general indication of how their function relates to that of the basal ganglia.
The right panel (B) highlights reciprocal connections between cortical regions — identified by the
Brodmann areas 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 46 — and the hippocampal complex
via the adjacent perirhinal (blue) and the parahippocampal (red) areas. The indicated Brodmann
areas generally provide a more nuanced understanding of their possible function than does simply
stipulating the cortical lobe they reside in.
including the hippocampal complex and basal ganglia, e.g., between the dentate gyrus and CA1 in
the hippocampus and as layered networks inside individual subcomponents such as the mossy fiber
network within the dentate gyrus. Each level solves different problems, offers general insights and
provides hints about how one might realize such solutions in artificial systems.
Figure 4 describes how subcortical nuclei such as the hippocampal complex and basal ganglia
interact with cortical regions. Such attributions provide insight on how to construct complex ar-
tificial neural architectures composed of simpler subnetworks ostensibly responsible for component
functions including perception, action selection and episodic memory.
Here we consider two levels of granularity: the first is coarse grained relying on major anatomical
divisions illustrated in Figure 1. The second is somewhat finer grained and relies on areal divisions
based on cytoarchitectural distinctions involving cell types, neural processes including dendrites and
axons, and other histological characteristics.
The former generally employs Korbinian Brodmann’s decomposition of the cortex into 52 areas
published in 1909 [32] and revised several times since then to take advantage of more modern
staining and imaging technologies as well as improved methods for functional localization. In many
cases, identifying the Brodmann area associated with the endpoint of a neural connection can tell
us a good deal about the functional relationship between two brain regions.
The left side of Figure 4 (A) highlights the reciprocal connections between two subnuclei of the
basal ganglia, the putamen and caudate nucleus, and locations in prefrontal cortex responsible for
influencing action selection by adjusting input to the basal ganglia and, by way of the thalamus,
locations in the parietal and temporal cortex that provide information about the current state
relevant to decision making.
We can often improve functional descriptions if we localize to specific Brodmann areas. For
example, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is located in the prefrontal cortex is a region of the frontal
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lobes involved in the cognitive process of decision-making. In humans it consists of Brodmann area
10, 11 and 47. It is defined as the part of the prefrontal cortex that receives projections from the
medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus, and is thought to represent emotion and reward in decision
making [28]. The prefrontal cortex, consisting of Brodmann areas 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 44, 45, 46
and 47, includes the OFC but covers a wider range of functionality.
The right side of Figure 4 (B) highlights reciprocal connections between cortical areas — Brod-
mann areas 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 46 — and the hippocampal complex via
the adjacent perirhinal cortex (shown as blue connections) and the parahippocampal cortex (shown
as red connections) that are involved in representing and recognizing objects and environmental
scenes.
The anatomy of the brain and patterns of connectivity linking its major functional areas provide
a structural account that derives from and informs function. However, functional analyses relating
to human cognition require technologies that are able to record neural activity or its correlates
aligned with relevant behavioral features. Non-human model systems often employed when invasive
technology is required.
On the one hand, optogenetics, two-photon microscopy and conventional electrophysiology are
able to record from and modify the electrical activity of tens to thousands of neurons at the resolution
of a few microns. While this represents progress, the coverage is inadequate for many studies, and
the methods are, for the most part, limited to non-human subjects due to the invasive nature of
their practical application [56, 30, 188, 187].
Conversely, fMRI can used to study awake, behaving humans performing a wide range of cog-
nitive tasks, but relies on signals that are at best indirectly related to neural activity as in the case
of blood oxygen levels, and that are currently limited to spatial resolutions on the order of tens of
millimeters and temporal resolutions on the order of hundreds of milliseconds [73, 74, 33].
Moreover, the electrical activity of individual neurons is but one marker for neural function.
Other pathways including diffuse signaling by way of chemical neuromodulation and genetic activ-
ity and protein transport at the cellular level are becoming increasingly important as markers for
behavior at multiple time scales [179]. Despite these limitations, neuroscientists have made con-
siderable progress by combining information from different model systems using multiple recording
technologies.
2.3 Sensorimotor Hierarchy
Much of the cortex is in the business of learning representations of concepts relevant to survival.
Perception is the means by which we apprehend and act on the physical realization of the concepts
we have learned. It seems obvious that perception serves action. It may not seem so obvious that
action serves perception, but the fact is we are almost always moving our head, hands and torso in
order to resolve ambiguities in what we see, feeling the shape of unfamiliar objects in order to grasp
them firmly and twisting about to see who is behind us calling our name or to get a better idea of
where we’ve come from in order to ensure we can retrace our steps. These are complex sensorimotor
activities we depend on every day.
In thinking about physically realizable concepts we think first about what they look, feel, sound
and smell like. The sensory cortex is responsible for constructing a hierarchy of representations to
characterize such concepts, not to capture everything we sense, but rather to account for what we
need to know about concepts to survive. Reconstructing scenes with photographic realism is not
what our sensory systems were designed for. Circuits of the primary sensory cortex feed into the
circuits of the (unimodal) association sensory cortex that feed into (multimodal) sensory cortex. All
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Figure 5: A simplified block diagram of the cortex. The column on the left represents the posterior
cortex including the occipital, temporal and parietal lobes. The column on the right represents the
frontal lobe of the cortex corresponding to the primary motor cortex, premotor cortex (association
motor cortex) and prefrontal cortex. Green arrows represent interaction with the environment,
black arrows represent sensorimotor abstractions and red arrows indicate cognitive activity relating
speech, planning and abstract thinking. See the main text for more detail. Adapted from Figure 8.9
in [68]
of these representations are abstract and yet patterns of regionalization are remarkably preserved
within species [36, 146, 103].
Concepts arise in patterns of neural activity that account for what we need to know about them,
including how they appear to us so we can recognize them, what affordances they offer for us to
make use of them and how we might predict their occurrence in decision making. Many of the
concepts that are represented in our brains serve to model the dynamics of physical systems that
we interact with every day, such as riding a bike, working with tools, opening doors, negotiating
stairs and riding escalators in department stores. Just as important, if not more so, are the social
dynamics we deal with at work and school with their constantly shifting personal relationships and
status rankings.
If you are a software engineer designing robot control systems, you might give action much the
same scrutiny as perception and build a parallel hierarchy of representations that describes the
concepts that relate to movement including navigation, articulation and manipulation ranging from
servo-motor commands to strategies for moving furniture, but designing or learning these hierarchies
independently is generally a bad idea. In mammals, these two hierarchies are tightly coupled to
account for how they depend on one another [69].
Indeed, determining what sensory representations to learn depends upon and influences what
motor representations to learn and vice versa, where we follow the convention of using the term
motor as a catchall term for concepts relating to muscles and movement. As pointed out in the
introduction, there is evidence to suggest that circuits occurring early in the ventral visual stream
code for object-selective features and exhibit large-scale organization characterized by the high-level
properties of animacy and object size [104, 114].
Figure 5 is a simplified block diagram of the cortex organized as two columns. The left column
represents the posterior cortex consisting of the occipital, temporal and parietal lobes that are
primarily concerned with processing sensory information. The relevant brain areas are summarized
in three blocks roughly corresponding to primary sensory cortex, unimodal association cortex and
multimodal association cortex stacked so the least abstract concepts are on the bottom and most
abstract on the top. The combined area is often referred to as semantic memory and characterized
as long-term declarative memory [26].
The right column represents the frontal lobe of the cortex corresponding to the primary motor
cortex, premotor cortex (associative motor cortex) and prefrontal cortex. The primary motor cortex
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is responsible for creating abstract representations of motor activity throughout the body. The pre-
motor cortex is responsible for integrating sensory and motor abstractions to construct sensorimotor
representations. The prefrontal cortex orchestrates cognitive behavior including speech, planning
and abstract thinking, and is reciprocally connected to the association areas just mentioned as well
subcortical structures including the basal ganglia and hippocampus.
The two columns are connected with one another at multiple levels: by physical interaction
with the environment (green arrows), by sensorimotor abstraction and alignment (black arrows),
and by cognitive effort in directing activity mediated through subcortical structures (red arrows).
This arrangement supports the formation of rich representations that serve a wide range of cognitive
function. The sensorimotor connections and feedback through the environment provide an inductive
bias to guide learning, ground inference and reduce sample complexity by reducing reliance on
labeled data and enabling opportunities for unsupervised learning [16].
Simple as this model of cortical function may seem, it may be one of the most important
architectural contributions of neuroscience to the development of artificial intelligence patterned
after the human brain. Some of the lessons have already been integrated into the discipline of
control theory through exposure to early work in biological cybernetics [67, 111, 93, 72, 122, 174],
but some of the most important lessons impact the application of machine learning in building
autonomous embodied systems including robots and digital assistants as alluded to above.
2.4 Basal Ganglia
There is a long history of neuroscientists constructing computational models of human cogni-
tion [117, 118, 110, 136, 29]. Different modeling tools make different assumptions and support
different levels of detail from rule-based systems to spiking neurons [140, 141, 149, 60, 27, 95]. In
this paper, we are primarily concerned with computational models that leverage ideas from neu-
roscience to develop AI systems for practical problems. In this subsection and the next, we take
a closer look at the basal ganglia and hippocampus using models from neuroscience that reveal
computational principles we can apply in a wide range of practical problems.
In contrast with the relative simplicity of the neocortical architecture, the basal ganglia consist
of specialized subcortical nuclei that are related by their evolved function. In the following, we
emphasize and simplify some of those nuclei and ignore others to focus the discussion and simplify
the biology. The basal ganglia provide the basis for motor activity controlled by circuits in the
brainstem and conserved throughout vertebrate evolution for nearly half a billion years. The cerebral
cortex has been around in the form of a six-layer sheet tiled with a repeating columnar structure
since the early mammals came on the scene in the Jurassic period about 200 million years ago. Our
lineage separated from mice around 100 million and from macaques and other old world monkeys
around 25 million years ago. The modern human neocortex owes much to these earlier evolutionary
innovations but is different in ways that make possible our facility with language, complex social
organization and sophisticated abstract thinking. Compared with the basal ganglia, the neocortex
is structurally elegant and functionally general.
The basal ganglia have evolved along with our neocortex to provide us with a powerful thinking
machine, while at the same time leaving us to make do with some less-than-ideal adaptations. We
can simulate a conventional computer in our heads but are limited to fewer than a dozen memory
registers. Most of us can’t perform long division in our heads even though we might know the
algorithm and aided with paper and pencil carry out the necessary computations to produce an
answer. We rely on the same basic cognitive machinery we use to list a few names in alphabetical
order to perform all sorts of more complicated cognitive tasks. Even simpler, however, is the basic
operation of choosing one of several actions to perform next. The basal ganglia play a key role in
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Figure 6: The left panel (A) provides a highly stylized anatomical drawing of the basal ganglia.
Figure 4 (A) provides more anatomical detail while the above drawing abstracts from the structural
detail in order to simplify the functional account. The block diagram shown in the right panel (B)
depicts the primary components involved in action selection as functional blocks. The blocks shown
in blue represent components in the direct path and are described in the text proper. The blocks
shown in light green with dashed borders represent additional components that contribute to the
indirect path. Good explanations of the indirect path are described in O’Reilly et al [141] or Wang et
al [177] and we return to the basal ganglia in the next section when we look at the executive role
of the prefrontal cortex in modulating behavior.
supporting action selection and it is worth looking at in a little more detail in order get a handle on
some of the parts of the brain that figure prominently in human cognition. Recall that the cortex is
a sheet of neural tissue more or less homogeneous in terms of its local structure quite unlike almost
any other part of the brain except for the cerebellar cortex. The cortex sits on top of a structure
called the thalamus which among other things serves as a relay in passing information back and
forth between the cortex and various subcortical nuclei.
The basal ganglia consist of a bunch of circuits, of varied size, sometimes but not always consist-
ing primarily of one cell type, sometimes but not necessarily compactly clustered together, sporting
projections that seem to wander off aimlessly, but more or less located above the brainstem and
below the cortex. As a general principle, if a signal sets off along some path exiting from a circuit,
then expect some derivative of that signal to appear later reentering the circuit to serve as feedback.
Everything about the brain, and your entire body for that matter, has to be carefully regulated
to maintain a dynamic state of equilibrium, and unlike human designs, evolution is generally not
able to cleanly separate the parts of the circuit that perform computations in service to behav-
ior from those that deal with respiration, immune response, waste removal, cell repair, death and
regeneration, etc.
The basal ganglia are depicted in Figure 6 (A) taking some artistic license to keep things simple.
The thalamus along with another structure called the striatum provide the interface between the
cortex and basal ganglia. The striatum is a combination of a number of smaller nuclei that are
anatomically and functionally related; they include the Globus Pallidus (GP), Putamen and Caudate
Nucleus and aside from their function as part of the striatum, only the GP will figure prominently
in our discussion and only one part of it — referred to as the internal GP and identified with the
”i” subscript to distinguish it from the external part with ”e” subscript.
The other players include the Substantia Nigra (SN) which is at one end of the striatum nestled
close to the amygdala which is part of the limbic system involved with memory, decision-making
and modulating emotional responses, and the Subthalamic Nucleus (STN). You can think of the
cortex as integrating sensory and motor information and making suggestions for what action to take
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next and the amygdala as supplying information pertaining to the possible emotional consequences
of taking different actions to be used as input to action selection. Figure 6 (B) reconfigures these
component nuclei into a smaller number of functionally motivated blocks that control two pathways
— the direct pathway associated primarily with inhibition and consisting of the internal GP and
SN and the indirect pathway playing an excitatory role and consisting of the external GP and
STN [141, 177],
The lines connecting the functional blocks shown in Figure 6 (B) imply neural connectivity, with
arrows indicating the direction of influence and colors indicating the valence of the influence, green
for excitatory and red for inhibitory. In the action selection cycle, the cortex forwards activations
that you can think of as suggestions for what action to take next. These suggestions are propa-
gated through the striatum and forwarded along the direct pathway where two stages of inhibitory
neurons initially suppress all of the suggestions and propagate signals back the cortex to activate
inhibitory neurons that suppress activity at the source. As this cycle continues, an additional pro-
cess takes place in the indirect path — identified with dashed lines — that weighs the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed actions taking in information from throughout the cortex and
adjusting the inhibitory bias accordingly.
Eventually, one proposal wins out and all of the others are suppressed allowing a single preferred
action to be executed. This cycle of exploring the options for acting and then selecting a single
action to execute is constantly repeated during your waking hours. Additional machinery in the
thalamus and brain stem regulate whether or not to forward suggestions for acting during sleep
when your cortex receives no sensory input and hence any suggestions for acting uninformed by
sensory input are ill-advised if not outright dangerous. The above description doesn’t begin to
convey the complexity of what’s going on at the level of individual neurons. Suffice it to say that
the usual perfunctory summary consisting of ”the winner takes all” doesn’t begin to do it justice.
The subtleties that arise from the way in which the evidence for and against an action proposal
is combined, how ties are broken and deciding when enough evaluation is determined sufficient to
make a final choice.
2.5 Hippocampal Complex
Figure 12 provides a glimpse of how we construct memories of our experience and subsequently
retrieve those memories to support a diverse range of cognitive strategies. In this case, the hip-
pocampus will play a central role as did the basal ganglia in the previous example. In the next
section, we explore how the basal ganglia work in concert with the hippocampus to support rein-
forcement learning. For now, our goal is simply to describe the process whereby we consolidate and
then encode experience. In doing so we take the opportunity to talk about the process whereby we
retrieve memories, reconstruct a version of that past experience to perform counterfactual inference
and imagine possibilities that we have never actually experienced.
The name hippocampus like so many biological terms has obscure origins, generally in Latin or
Greek and in this case the latter, relating to its shape that looked like a seahorse to some early
anatomists. As shown in Figure 12 (A) it is primarily comprised of four subnuclei referred to as CA1,
CA2, CA3 and CA4, the first two characters in each abbreviation recalling a previous Latin name,
Cornu Ammanonis associated with a ram’s horn, apparently preferred by even earlier anatomists.
These nuclei are capped by the dentate gyrus (DG) at one end and the fornix at the other.
The hippocampus consists of two nearly identical structures, one in each hemisphere, connected
where the parallel tracts of the fornix come together at the midline of the brain. The hippocampus is
tightly coupled with the entorhinal cortex (EHC) that plays an important role in memory, navigation
and our perception of time. Information flows from the EHC to the hippocampus by one of two
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Figure 7: On the left you see a cartoon drawing of the hippocampus and related cortical and
subcortical areas. The primary components include the entorhinal cortex or EHC, the dentate
gyrus or DG and two hippocampal (out of four) nuclei referred to as CA3 and CA1. Figure 4
provides additional anatomical detail regarding the connections between cortical regions and the
perirhinal and parahippocampal areas adjacent to the hippocampus. The block diagram on the
right summarizes the component circuits, along with their projections and reciprocal connections.
pathways: either through the DG to CA3 or via reciprocal connections to and from CA1. The EHC
also has reciprocal connections to many cortical areas. Figure 4 (A) provides additional anatomical
detail.
In the process of creating a new memory, the hippocampus receives input from multiple cortical
areas relevant to current experience, consolidates this information in a condensed format that will
enable subsequent retrieval and stores the resulting encoding in memory. In retrieving an exist-
ing memory, The EHC starts with cortical activity, typically from motor and sensory association
areas, and uses this information to reconstruct a previous memory by activating cortical areas cor-
responding to the original memory. Before describing how we think such creative consolidation and
subsequent reconstruction works, a word about why this process is beneficial might be in order.
Almost every stage of memory is fraught with opportunities to alter stored representations of
prior experience. Reconstruction is a creative process in which we are more often than not forced to
fill in some details that we might think we observed at the time but actually didn’t. In the formation
of new memories, consolidation can only make do with whatever information about the experience
we have gleaned from observation and committed to short-term memory. If you don’t rehearse
what you’ve stored in short-term memory then it will quickly fade, losing detail and potentially
introducing errors of omission and commission.
The basic algorithm carried out by the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex working together is
illustrated in Figure 12 (B). There are two basic processes that we consider here: encoding new
memories and retrieving old memories. Encoding involves collecting information gleaned from di-
verse neural activity originating in multiple cortical regions and consolidating [130] this information
to construct a compact encoding that serves as a key or index that will enable subsequent stable
— meaning reliably consistent even in the presence of distracting information [59] — retrieval and
reconstruction.
EHC receives input from all cortical regions in a condensed form and the axons of EHC pyramidal
neurons project primarily to the DG but also to CA1. DG then projects to CA3 which plays a
particularly important role in encoding and retrieving memories. CA3 is thought to behave as
an autoassociative memory shown here as a recursive neural network. The crucial property of an
autoassociative memory is that it is able to retrieve an item from memory using only a portion of
the information associated with that item.
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Figure 8: The three panels shown here represent the autoassociative network representing the
function of CA3 in the hippocampus. Connection weights are shown as diagonal lines, e.g., the
dotted blue lines shown in the network on the far left represent the connection weights prior to any
training. The middle panel represents the network after encoding the stimulus pattern corresponding
to the cortical activation of A and C, and the panel on the far right represents the network, when
presented with a partial pattern consisting of just C, employing the recurrent connections of the
autoassociator to complete the pattern for the original stimulus and using it to reconstruct the
corresponding activation of A and C in the cortex.
The hippocampus serves as an index, storing different patterns of cortical activity and allowing
us to retrieve our memories using only a fragment of what we can recall. The recurrent connections
of CA3 are thought to enable this sort of creative reconstruction and play a role in both encoding
and retrieving memories. CA3 then projects to CA1 and from there back to the EHC completing
the loop and thereby providing recurrent activity involving a much larger circuit.
There are a couple of details that are worth pointing out here as they demonstrate both the
strengths and weaknesses of human episodic memory. The first concerns the issue of retrieving a
complete memory given a partial index and the second concerns how to retrieve a memory when
that memory is similar to one or more other memories, at least in the sense that their respective
indices are similar to one another. In the model described here, the first issue is handled by the
autoassociative network.
The triptych shown in Figure 8 illustrates how the autoassociative network solves this problem.
The panel on the far left is meant to indicate the autoassociative network and its initial state. In the
middle panel, we assume the input from the dentate gyrus consist of the two sub patterns A and C
and illustrates the reciprocal connections that would be strengthened were we to train the network
with this composite pattern of activity. CA3 is responsible for encoding these memory specific
patterns of activity for all of our memories. The panel on the far right is intended to illustrate how
given a partial pattern, in this case just one of the two representative patterns that comprise the
composite pattern shown in the middle panel, is able to reconstruct the other representative pattern
by using the trained autoassociative network to first identify and then strengthen the connections
in the original composite.
The second detail concerns the possibility that the encodings for two memories are alike enough
to be mistaken with one another. A full account of any of the theories explaining how the human
brain solves this problem is beyond the scope of what we can go into here but one theory — first
articulated by David Marr [116, 183] — posits that, since the dentate gyrus has a larger number of
cells than the EHC, its forward projection will tend to produces an expansion recoding in the DG
leading to an increase in the separation between the patterns in CA3.
To complete our account of memory retrieval, we look at how the path that started in the EHC
loops back to complete a feedback loop that stabilizes the encoding of memories. So far we’ve seen
how an experience represented by a pattern of activity in the cortex is compressed and represented
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in the entorhinal cortex which projects this pattern onto the cells in the dentate gyrus thereby
increasing the separation between competing patterns the results of which are bound together
to generate an index. This index is fed to CA3 where it is incorporated in an autoassociative
recursive network so that subsequently when a feature of the original stimulus is present in our
conscious experience it activates a subset of the original neurons activated in CA3 and the recurrent
connections in the autoassociative network reactivate the remaining neurons completing the pattern
that was incorporated when the experience was initially encoded in memory.
The remaining step involves explaining how the representation in CA3 reactivates the original
stimulus. As shown in Figure 12 (B), the entorhinal cortex projects to CA1 in addition to the dentate
gyrus. When neurons are projected forward to DG and activated in CA3 they are also activated in
CA. Since they are activated at the same time, the connections between the neurons in CA3 and CA1
are strengthened by long-term potentiation. The result is a stable, sparse, invertible mapping that
allows the hippocampus to recreate the original cortical activity patterns during retrieval [137, 119].
Reactivating the same combination of cortical areas as the original stimulus and causing us to
reexperience the event as a memory. An additional process called reconsolidation is thought to
allow previously-consolidated memories become labile again as a consequence of reactivation. See
Box A for detail on storing and retrieving memories in the hippocampus.
Box A: Pattern Separation, Completion and Integration
As discussed in Section 2.5, pattern separation reduces the similarity between input patterns
of activity by orthogonalizing inputs to minimize interference between patterns and increase
hippocampal storage capacity [99]. Pattern separation involves primarily DG and CA3 — see
Section 2.5 for an explanation of the acronyms. The DG maps input from EHC to a much
larger and sparsely active GC population. In rats, the number of neurons in the DG exceeds
that in EHC by about 5:1 [58]. This expansion coding with strong inhibitory interneurons and
a competitive learning rule can greatly reduce the overlap between inputs. The DG connects
to CA3 mainly through mossy fibers that reliably activate CA3 pyramidal neurons and sus-
tain activation for tens of seconds [175]. Each CA3 neuron receives a small number of these
connections from DG so the degree of sparsity is maintained [99].
Pattern completion reconstructs the complete stored pattern given a partial input. Each
pyramidal neuron in CA3 receives a large number of synapses from other pyramidal cells form-
ing a recurrent network that serves as an autoassociative memory for pattern completion [99].
During learning, recurrent connections between active CA3 neurons are strengthened and later
when neurons encoding part of an episode are reactivated, they recurrently activate other con-
nected cells to reconstruct the original episode. Basket cells in CA3 form inhibitory synapses
to pyramidal cells to dampen excitatory responses thereby emphasizing key features [133].
Pattern completion provides access to relevant experience to support decision making
in novel situations, and while pattern separation helps downstream discrimination, perfectly
orthogonal representations are not ideal in the case we want events that occurred close together
to have similar representations. In this case, pattern integration represents related experiences
as overlapping populations. There are a number of neural mechanisms suggested to support
pattern integration in the hippocampus. We consider two here, the first of which involves
neurogenesis.
There is evidence that hundreds of new GCs are added to an adult human hippocampus
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everyday [168], and stronger evidence suggests that thousands of new GCs are added to rodents
hippocampus, though not all survive [101]. Unlike mature GCs that fire sparsely, immature GCs
are more active and have lower threshold for induction of long-term potentiation [1, 70, 163].
Aimone et al [1] posit that a population of hyperactive young GCs could collectively encode
events close in time to decrease pattern separation in DG. Others hypothesize that neurogenesis
may increase storage capacity by protecting old GCs from new information [19, 185] or that
young active GCs could improve the resolution of memory content [2].
Alternatively, pattern integration might be enabled by recurrent connections involving
the hippocampus and neocortex. Recurrent connections in the hippocampus, mainly in CA3
region, can replay an entire episode given a part of it. The replayed episode is backprojected
to the neocortex through EHC, that can then recirculate the replayed episode as input to
hippocampus to trigger replay of another episode that has overlapping elements with previous
one. Kumaran et al [108] propose that this kind replay between hippocampus and neocortical
regions can combine representations of elements that seldom occur together but appear in
similar contexts. In addition to integrating experiences with shared elements, backprojection to
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) may bias hippocampus to reactivate experiences that are
more behaviorally relevant [162] — see Box B for more on behavioral relevance. The concurrent
presentation of these memories in mPFC may further improve the learning of abstraction
relations across episodes.
3 Architecture
The architecture of the human brain, at any scale you choose to consider, bears little or no resem-
blance to conventional computer architectures. There is no separate program memory, no centralized
processing unit, no highly stable, random-access, non-volatile memory and nothing like the digital
level of abstraction that enables software engineers to ignore instabilities in the analog circuits that
implement logic gates. Since representations (data) are collocated with the transformations (com-
putations) that operate on them and different parts of the brain perform different computations
requiring different types of memory, the human brain has to support multiple memory systems.
Human memory is characterized along several dimensions depending on what sort of information
is stored, how it is accessed and how long it remains accessible [43]. Short-term, long-term and
working memory are differentiated on the basis of access, persistence, volatility and the effort
required to maintain. Short term is measured in seconds, long term in days, months or years and
working memory is essentially short-term memory that can be maintained (with cognitive effort)
indefinitely and manipulated (very roughly) analogous to a register in the ALU of a von Neumann
machine [12].
Declarative memory is defined by the ability to explicitly (consciously) recollect facts, whereas
non-declarative memory is accessed unconsciously or implicitly through performance rather than
recollection. Episodic memory is generally considered long-term and declarative, and is further
differentiated on the basis of the kinds of relationships it can encode, including spatial, temporal
and social [169, 156, 109, 41]. Procedural knowledge, including motor, visuospatial and cognitive
skills, is encoded in the cerebellum, the putamen and caudate nucleus of the basal ganglia, the
motor cortex, and frontal cortex.
To ground the discussion, we introduce the programmer’s apprentice as an example of the sort
of digital assistants we envision as an application of the technologies presented in this paper. We
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consider several core components of the apprentice architecture each of which depends on or im-
plements one or more memory systems. Drawing upon concepts covered earlier, we consider three
major elements:
1. the role of the posterior cortex role in supporting declarative knowledge and semantic memory,
2. the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex as the basis for motivation and executive function, and
3. the hippocampal formation in supporting episodic memory formation, retrieval and consoli-
dation.
3.1 Embodied Cognition
Embodied cognition is the theory that an organism’s body shapes its understanding of the environ-
ment it inhabits and grounds its perception of and interaction with that environment. Importantly,
the environment completes a loop that links perception and action enabling the organism to for-
mulate and test predictive models that guide behavior. Such models serve as the foundation for
commonsense reasoning and provide a starting point for understanding a much wider range of con-
crete and abstract systems, giving rise to a tendency in humans to attribute self-styled agency to
both animate and inanimate objects.
To ground our discussion, we consider a personal assistant that works with a software engineer
in the role of an apprentice learning on the job, as was common in the guilds and trade associations
of medieval cities. The programmer’s apprentice we imagine here is a novice programmer but has
the intuitive skills of an idiot savant, given that the apprentice has a suite of powerful programming
tools as an integral part of its brain. These tools constitute the assistant’s body, its peripheral
nervous system if you will.
The original programmer’s apprentice was the name of project initiated at MIT by Chuck Rich
and Dick Waters and Howie Shrobe to build an intelligent assistant that would help a programmer
to write, debug and evolve software. Our version of the programmer’s apprentice is implemented
as an instance of a hierarchical neural network architecture. It has a variety of conventional inputs
including speech, text and vision, as well as output modalities including the ability to run code and
display program output and execution traces.
The programmer’s apprentice relies on multiple sources of input, including dialogue in the form
of text utterances, visual information from an editor buffer shared by the programmer and apprentice
and information from a fully instrumented integrated development environment (FIDE) designed for
analyzing, writing and debugging code adapted to interface seamlessly with the apprentice as we
might move our limbs or direct our gaze. As in case of the legs you were born with, the apprentice
has to learn how to use its prosthetic extensions.
This input is processed by a collection of neural networks modeled after the primary sensory
areas in the primate brain. The outputs of these networks feed into a hierarchy of additional
networks corresponding to uni-modal secondary and multi-modal association areas that produce
increasingly abstract representations as one ascends the hierarchy as illustrate in Figure 9.
Architecturally, the apprentice’s FIDE is an instance of a differentiable neural computer (DNC)
introduced by Alex Graves and his colleagues at DeepMind [79]. The assistant combined with its
FIDE corresponds to a neural network that can read from and write to an external memory matrix,
combining the characteristics of a random-access memory and set of memory-mapped device drivers
and programmable interrupt controllers. The interface supports a fixed number of commands and
channels that provide feedback.
15
Figure 9: The architecture of the apprentice sensory cortex including the layers corresponding to
abstract, multi-modal representations handled by the association areas can be realized as a multi-
layer hierarchical neural network model consisting of standard neural network components. This
graphic depicts these components as encapsulated in thought bubbles of the sort often employed
in cartoons to indicate what some cartoon character is thinking. Analogously, the technical term
”thought vector” is used to refer to the activation state of the output layer of such a component.
All of the bubbles appear to contain networks with exactly the same architecture, where one might
expect sensory modality to dictate local architecture. The hierarchical architecture depicted here is
modeled after the mammalian neocortex that appears to be tiled with columnar component networks
called cortical columns that self-assemble into larger networks and adapt locally to accommodate
their input. In practice, it may be necessary to engineer modality-specific networks for the lowest
levels of the hierarchy — analogous to the primary sensory and motor areas of the neocortex, but
more general-purpose networks for the higher levels in the hierarchy — analogous to the sensory
and motor association areas.
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The integrated development environment and its associated software engineering tools constitute
an extension of the apprentices capabilities in much the same way that a piano or violin extends a
musician. The extension becomes an integral part of the person possessing it and over time their
brain creates a topographic map that facilitates interacting with the extension. We expect the same
to occur in the case of the assistant.
3.2 Conscious Attention
Stanislas Dehaene and his colleagues have developed a computational model of consciousness that
provides a practical framework for thinking about consciousness that is sufficiently detailed for much
of what an engineer might care about in designing digital assistants [49]. Dehaene’s work extends
the Global Workspace Theory of Bernard Baars [11]. Dehaene’s version of the theory combined
with Yoshua Bengio’s concept of a consciousness prior and deep reinforcement learning [126, 131]
suggest a model for constructing and maintaining the cognitive states that arise and persist during
complex problem solving [23].
Global Workspace Theory accounts for both conscious and unconscious thought with the primary
distinction for our purpose being that the former has been selected for attention and the latter has
not been so selected. Sensory data arrives at the periphery of the organism. The data is initially
processed in the primary sensory areas located in posterior cortex, propagates forward and is further
processed in increasingly-abstract multimodal association areas. Even as information flows forward
toward the front of the brain, the results of abstract computations performed in the association
areas are fed back toward the primary sensory cortex. This basic pattern of activity is common in
all mammals.
Humans have a large frontal cortex that includes machinery responsible for conscious awareness
and that depends on an extensive network of specialized neurons called spindle cells that span a
large portion of the posterior cortex allowing circuits in the frontal cortex to sense relevant activity
throughout this area and then manage this activity by creating and maintaining the persistent state
vectors that are necessary when generating extended narratives or working on complex problems
that require juggling many component concepts at once. Figure 10 suggests a neural architecture
combining the idea of a global workspace with that of an attentional system for identifying relevant
input.
These attentional networks are connected to regions throughout the cortex and are trained
via reinforcement learning to recognize events worth attending to according to the learned value
function. Using extensive networks of connections — both incoming and outgoing, attentional
networks are able to create a composite representation of the current situation that can serve
a wide range of executive cognitive functions, including decision making and imagining possible
futures. The basic idea of a neural network trained to attend to relevant parts of the input is key
to a number of the systems that we’ll be looking at.
In their paper [79] in Nature, The authors note that ”there are interesting parallels between
the memory mechanisms of a DNC and the functional capabilities of the mammalian hippocam-
pus. DNC memory modification is fast and can be one-shot, resembling the associative long-term
potentiation of hippocampal CA3 and CA1 synapses. The hippocampal dentate gyrus, a region
known to support neurogenesis, has been proposed to increase representational sparsity, thereby
enhancing memory capacity: usage-based memory allocation and sparse weightings may provide
similar facilities.” See the discussion of neurogenesis as an algorithmic technique in Box A.
The global workspace summarizes recent experience in terms of sensory input, its integration,
abstraction and inferred relevance to the context in which the underlying information was acquired.
To exploit the knowledge encapsulated in such experience, the apprentice must identify and make
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Figure 10: The basic capabilities required to support conscious awareness can be realized in a
relatively simple computational architecture that represents the apprentice’s global workspace and
incorporates a model of attention that surveys activity throughout somatosensory and motor cortex,
identifies the activity relevant to the current focus of attention and then maintains this state of
activity so that it can readily be utilized in problem solving. In the case of the apprentice, new
information is ingested into the model at the system interface, including dialog in the form of text,
visual information in the form of editor screen images, and a collection of programming-related
signals originating from a suite of software development tools. Single-modality sensory information
feeds into multimodal association areas to create rich abstract representations. Attentional networks
in the prefrontal cortex take as input activations occurring throughout the posterior cortex. These
networks are trained by reinforcement learning to identify areas of activity worth attending to and
the learned policy selects a set of these areas to attend to and sustain. This attentional process is
guided by a prior that prefers low-dimensional thought vectors corresponding to statements about
the world that are either true, highly probable or very useful for making decisions. Humans can
sustain only a few such activations at a time. The apprentice need not be so constrained.
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Figure 11: You can think of the episodic memory encoded in the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex
as RAM and the actively maintained memories in the prefrontal cortex as the contents of registers
in a conventional von Neumann architecture. Since the activated memories have different temporal
characteristics and functional relationships with the contents of the global workspace, we implement
them as two separate NTM memory systems each with its own special-purpose controller. Actively
maintained information highlighted in the global workspace is used to generate keys for retrieving
relevant memories that augment the highlighted activations. While the associative keys required
to access locations only partially match locations, they can can still be used to guide attention
allowing the NTM to recognize and even partially merge related locations. In general, locations in
memory correspond to thought vectors that can be composed with other thought vectors to shape
the global context for interpretation.
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available relevant experience. The apprentice’s experience is encoded as tuples in an NTM that
supports associative recall. We’ll ignore the details of the encoding process to focus on how episodic
memory is organized, searched and applied to solving problems.
3.3 Action Selection
In both neuroscience and artifial intelligence, reinforcement learning problems are typically modeled
as Markov decision problems (MDPs). While MDPs can be solved in polynomial time, the size of
the state space is often prohibitively large, making practical solution intractable [113]. Hierarchical
reinforcement learning offers a means of reducing the computational burden by decomposing the
state space resulting in a relatively small number of tractable MDPs each of which can be solved
independently [97, 54, 91]. However, the problem of finding an optimal decomposition is itself
intractable and hence it is necessary to resort heuristic methods and approximate solutions.
There exist a number of approaches that develop solutions to the problem of hierarchical re-
inforcement learning (HRL) employing various decomposition strategies, several of which we draw
inspiration from [132, 5, 157, 107, 15, 127, 144] including a few that relate to biological or biolog-
ically plausible models [149, 55, 64, 150]. It’s important to keep in mind that we are dealing a
partially-observable, high-dimensional, continuous state space, and an action space that includes
abstract cognitive activities in addition to concrete physical activities that engage the motor system
in interacting with the environment.
In the treatment here, we emphasize the problem of life-long learning as it relates to the non-
stationarity of underlying process as a consequence of changes in the external environment and
changes in the goals of the agent and the neural substrate available for computation during devel-
opment and extending on into adulthood. In the case of a growing infant, the changes involve the
appearance and maturation of critical circuits and the limitations of finite memory. In both human
and machine, internal representations progress from concrete to abstract, building on a foundation
grounded in the environment. This maturation in cognitive capability is accelerated by a curriculum
that takes advantage of dependencies between concepts.
The network model shown in Figure 12 illustrates a system that takes as input a pattern of
neural activity originating in the medial temporal and inferior parietal cortex and selects an action
to perform. This particular example is meant to illustrate how episodic memory might play an
expanded role in action selection. For illustration, patterns of activity serve as proxies for the state
of the external environment and are represented in the figure as a sequence st, st−1, st−2, .... The
subnetworks labeled A and B are relatively straightforward multilayer neural networks that compute
features and generate representations as their output. Network A takes as input a representation
of the current state, and generates a representation of the context for action selection.
We’ll explain the function of the box labeled M in a moment; assume for now that it generates
a representation of the options available for acting in the current context. Network B then takes
these suggestions as input and produces as output a representation of the selected action. The
boxes labeled C, D, E and F are controllers for two differentiable neural computer (DNC) units that
provide storage and access for short-term and long-term memory respectively. The controllers on the
left are part of the online system for selecting actions. The controllers on the right are responsible for
off-line training during which the recorded actions, along with their associated states and rewards
are consolidated in long-term memory using experience replay.
The blue boxes represent stored information in the form of key-value pairs. Each key is associated
with a subset or subspace of the set of all states that represents a restricted domain of expertise for
selecting actions. The value for this key is a function implemented as a network trained as an expert
for the associated subspace. K is an embedding network that takes as input a sequence of states
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Figure 12: The network shown here takes as input a pattern of activation originating in the temporal
and parietal lobes and selects an action to perform. The subnetworks labeled A and B are relatively
straightforward multilayer neural networks that compute features and generate representations as
their output. Network A takes as input a representation of the current state, and generates a
representation of the context for action selection. Network K is an embedding network that takes
as input a sequence of states corresponding to recent activity and generates as output a unique key
associated with a subspace of the full MDP state space that includes the current state. The box
labeled M corresponds to a location in working memory. The networks C, D, E and F are controllers
for two differentiable neural computer (DNC) peripherals that provide storage and access for short-
term and long-term memory respectively. The long-term memory is used to store the weights for
networks that encode architecturally identical networks — only the weights are different — providing
specialized expertise in restricted domains corresponding to subspaces of the full MDP state space.
The model operates in two modes. In each cycle during the online mode, the C controller loads
the selected expert network into location M where it is fed the output of A and produces the input
to B. In this mode, the short-term memory is used to record activity traces that are subsequently
used in the offline mode to update the networks stored in long-term memory. The network in the
lower-right inset implements a version of pseudo rehearsal as a means of mitigating catastrophic
forgetting [65].
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corresponding to recent activity and generates as output a unique key associated with a subspace
of the current state. A given state can belong to more than one subspace and the particular key
selected at any given point in time depends on the current state and the immediately previous states
in a fixed window. The order of the states matters.
In the online phase, the embedding network retrieves this key which it forwards to the controller
labeled C that uses it to retrieve the expert for the relevant subspace. The box labeled M corresponds
to a location in working memory and in each online cycle the C controller loads the expert subsystem
in location M of working memory where it can be utilized to compute a set of options appropriate
for the current state. During off-line periods the system uses the recorded sequences of activity to
run some variant of experience replay to update the relevant expert subsystems stored in long term
memory [6, 161, 112].
The training that occurs offline involves adjusting the weights of networks using relatively small
samples and so runs the risk of catastrophic interference in transfer learning [120]. One way in
which we hope to ameliorate the adverse consequences of catastrophic interference is by defining
separate networks for separate subspaces. The embedding space method mentioned in describing K
is designed to isolate expertise by identifying states that tend to occur together. The hope is that
the actions exercised is such states will tend to be interrelated and hence they should be represented
using the same network to facilitate their coordination.
Of course temporal proximity in their occurrence doesn’t guarantee they serve the same task
since we are always getting distracted or interrupted requiring us to interleave tasks that have very
little to do with one another. It may be possible to segment activity streams into coherent tasks in a
similar way to how we segment conversations involving multiple speakers [165, 166]. Alternatively,
there has been some success with the method of pseudo rehearsal which consists of retraining existing
networks by interleaving new examples with synthetic-examples produced by randomly activating
the existing network [37, 100, 8, 65, 66, 151].
In this model the STM roughly corresponds to the hippocampus as the storage system for
episodic memory. The LTM resembles the cerebellum in the way that it essentially compiles prior
activity to construct a set of programs each of which spans some portion of the overall state space. As
described above, the STM is only used for temporary storage awaiting off-line replay to consolidate
recent memories. An alternative is to maintain a much larger collection of episodic memories that
can be used in a manner similar to that suggested in Gershman and Daw who posit that we routinely
draw upon our stored memories in the hippocampus to figure out what to do in novel situations not
covered by our other sources of procedural knowledge [71]. See Box B for more detail concerning
episodic memory and experience replay.
Box B: Replaying Experience, Consolidating Memory
When we encounter a new experience in the environment, we do not act independently of
the past, but rather, our past experiences substantially inform our present decisions. Here,
we introduce the basic principles of hippocampal replay and a few key ways in which it has
motivated reinforcement learning algorithms.
Replay is the process by which hippocampal representations of previous experiences are
sequentially reactivated [35]. Studies show that cells in the rodent hippocampus replay past
experiences to stabilize behaviorally relevant memories [135, 96]. Though initially observed in
spatial tasks, recent work suggests that non-spatial task states are also replayed, and that this
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phenomenon is common in humans [164].
In the reinforcement learning literature, the experience replay algorithm was introduced as
an analogical framework in online learning agents [112]. Transitions containing state, action,
and reward information are sequentially stored in memory and sampled randomly for learning.
Randomly replaying old memories not only allows decorrelation of consecutive experiences
encountered during data collection, but also enables reuse of training data, increasing sample
efficiency, and encourages resampling of rare experiences, potentially alleviating forgetting.
A relatively well-studied question is what to replay. Some studies suggest the correlation of
replay frequency with novelty approximated by temporal difference (TD) error [63], and others
with high reward [135]. In particular, dopaminergic release, which encodes both novelty and
reward [123], enhances sharp wave-ripple activation — the basic unit of replay. Yet other studies
show that experiences more vulnerable to forgetting are more likely to be replayed [160]. While
the exact selection algorithm is unknown, the observed association with novelty inspired the
prioritized experience replay algorithm which samples experiences with probabilities weighted
by their TD errors and is now consistently preferred to the originally proposed uniform sampling
variant [161].
The significantly less studied question is what happens during replay. Besides re-learning
of experiences, many neuroscientists support the idea that replay also serves as a substrate for
memory consolidation — the gradual integration of new experiences processed into existing
knowledge representations in the neocortex [184, 120, 98, 21, 108], as to stabilize memories
against interference. The idea is that replaying information stored in memory will encourage
synaptic consolidation processes.
While we lack a precise understanding of the underlying mechanisms of consolidation in
the brain, in our architecture we frame consolidation as the process by which experiences
are used to update expert subsystems stored in long-term memory. We propose an adaptive
replay algorithm whereby experiences with contexts similar to the current context are replayed
and thus preferentially consolidated into long-term storage. Since action selection directly
depends on the relevant expert network drawn from long-term memory, we can ensure to
maximally update the currently relevant expert network with existing memories related to its
corresponding context. This algorithm is partly inspired by the result by [96] whereby they
observed that when a rat pauses at a branching point in a maze, it replays representations of
trajectories in the past with similar context to drive its present decision-making.
There exist many other cognitively inspired variants of experience replay. One example is
hindsight experience replay [6], where the agent pretends that whatever state it reaches had
been the goal state from the start and learns from the experience regardless of whether it
actually succeeded, just as humans can learn from undesirable outcomes.
In this case, the LTM stores what can be thought of as subroutines or libraries for solving
routine problems. Used in the manner described in Gershman and Daw [71], the DNC labeled STM
more closely captures the functionality of the hippocampus in combining short-term and long-term
episodic memories with specific procedural knowledge based on past experience that may or may
not be common enough to warrant compiling as a standalone library. The dentate gyrus is best
known for its ability to separate patterns to avoid mistaking one pattern for another. Less well
understood is a possible complementary role that involves integrating similar patterns.
The ability to draw upon episodic memory to select what to do in situations similar to those
encountered in the past provides a simple form of one-shot learning. It could enable us to make
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predictions, perform hypothetical reasoning and put ourselves in someone else’s shoes assuming
that our ability to retrieve memories allows us match situations that we find ourselves that we
haven’t experienced, but know from someone else’s experience. It might avoid some of the problems
with interference if the process of integrating new procedural knowledge with old could be spread
out over longer periods if, say, each time you encounter a similar situation you make only minor
adjustments to the weights of the associated subspace expert network.
3.4 Executive Control
There is a growing consensus and a fair bit of evidence to support the hypothesis that the human
frontal cortex is in charge of executive control, goal-directed planning and abstract thinking. There
are differences in opinion about how these cognitive processes are implemented and how they co-
ordinate their activities with that of the rest of the brain. One thing that seems clear is that the
frontal cortex and in particular the prefrontal cortex employs many of the same strategies as do
networks elsewhere in the brain, both cortical and subcortical.
In particular, circuits in the prefrontal cortex recapitulate the coarse-to-fine, concrete-to-abstract
feature hierarchies that we see in the sensory, motor and somatosensory cortex. They exhibit the
profuse reciprocal recurrent connections between levels of abstraction that enable us to generalize
on the basis of relatively small amounts of information, learn to make accurate predictions in an
unsupervised manner depending on observations and interactions with the environment to ground
our conclusions, and that provide the foundation for constructing a rich repertoire of representations
that serve decision-making.
The neural correlates of abstract thinking, including the circuits that enable us to solve practical
problems as well as pursue pure mathematics, are generally agreed to be located in the prefrontal
cortex with reciprocal connections throughout the rest of the cerebral cortex, the cerebellar cortex
and subcortical regions including the basal ganglia, hippocampal formation and parts of the limbic
system involved with emotion, motivation and episodic memory. See Box C for more detail regarding
abstraction, hierarchy and executive oversight in the prefrontal cortex.
Box C: Hierarchy, Abstraction and Executive Control
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is generally considered to be responsible for executive cogni-
tive control and enabling the synthesis of novel behavior. Here, we briefly review prefrontal
anatomy, development and physiology, focusing on three key executive cognitive functions: at-
tentional set, working memory and action selection. For each function, we suggest how our
current understanding might lead to new architectures and algorithms for AI systems.
The PFC sits atop a group of hierarchically organized sensory and motor areas in the
cortex enforced through reciprocal anatomical connections [69]. This arrangement, referred to
as Fusters hierarchy, motivates computational models of the PFC that posit the development
of highly abstract representations of the sensorimotor context that can be used understand
what we perceive and direct how we act [29]. In addition to connections between layers,
Fusters hierarchy stipulates reciprocal connections between sensory and motor areas of cortex
at the same level of abstraction within each layer of the hierarchy. This intralayer connectivity
between perception and motor suggests that action representations feed back into and enhance
perception, a principle codified in the notion of corollary discharge [121].
Beyond the model of network interactions, intralayer connectivity in Fuster’s hierarchy
24
suggests that each layer of the hierarchy along with the layers below but excluding those above,
forms a self-contained perception-action loop. Evidently the neocortex undergoes a series of
developmental stages with the PFC among the last areas to mature [82]. This implies training
of a complex agent may need to unfold in a manner akin to greedy layer-wise deep network
training [24, 20], with developmentally-staged, abstraction-comparable, layer-wise learning of
the coupled sensorimotor features.
Attentional set (ASET) refers to the preparation of downstream perception and motor
cortices for expected stimuli or action. ASET is exhibited in cued-attention tasks where, in
anticipating a visual stimuli, PFC and V4 will be active before the stimuli is given [171].
ASET suggests existing inhibitory attention masks may be augmented with additive excitatory
attention, allowing a neural network to reduce bottom-up input needed for neuron stimulation
or cause neuron firing in the absence of sensory input altogether. Allowing the controller to
generate new patterns via network activation even suggests a new model of imagination, with
improvements in both sensory synthesis [80] and planning [143].
Working memory is the maintenance of recent stimuli for subsequent action planning.
Working memory consists of groups of coupled neural circuits in the PFC called stripes that
are connected to potential target stimuli in sensory cortex and access controlled by circuits
in the basal ganglia. Computational models of working memory [90] include implementations
similar to the recurrent memory circuit of an LSTM cell [92], more exotic architectures involving
stacked LSTMs [77] and multiple memory stripes manipulated by a central controller.
In action selection, the PFC generates many actions that are approved or denied by the basal
ganglia; both basal ganglia and orbitomedial PFC receive dopaminergic afferents originating
in midbrain structures, providing a reward signal that reinforces learning [69]. Computational
models of dopaminergic systems [139] point to an architecture similar to existing actor-critic
models [125]; a key improvement is the modeling of reward inhibition, whereby learning ceases
for repetitive stimuli. Suppression of reward to prevent response overfitting could aid in tackling
other problems such as reward hacking [4], catastrophic forgetting, and lifelong learning [37],
all challenges in effectively managing the learning process.
With respect to hierarchical goal-based planning, there is growing evidence pointing to a set of
adjoining regions in the prefrontal cortex that are responsible for how abstract plans are initially se-
lected, subsequently refined and finally realized as concrete actions. These same regions also appear
to be involved in relational reasoning from simple binary relations to higher-order relationships.
These theoretical observations combined with behavioral studies and fMRI recordings have led
to a number of computational models of hierarchical planning that exhibit similar patterns of cog-
nitive activity. In particular, cognitive neuroscientists have developed models of how such abstract
hierarchical reasoning in the prefrontal cortex is related to what we know about how the basal
ganglia and areas of the limbic system involved in motivation contribute to action selection [136].
The network shown on the right in Figure 13 consists of three subnetworks that roughly align
with the lateral frontal polar cortex (bottom), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (middle) and anterior
premotor cortex (top) as shown in the figure. Each of the subnetworks is composed of three elements:
a recurrent multilayer perceptron constructed of interleaved convolutional and max-pooling layers
shown in orange, a multilayer attention network shown in green and a masking layer in blue that
selectively suppresses a subset of the outputs of the convolutional stack in accordance with the
output of the attention network.
Input to each of the three subnetworks includes areas of associative activity throughout the
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Figure 13: The panel on the left highlights three areas of the prefrontal cortex shown in the figure
from left to right (rostro-caudal) and referred to in the text as the lateral frontal polar cortex
(LFPC) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DPFC) and anterior premotor cortex (APMC). According
to the theory first articulated by Joaqu´ın Fuster and subsequently refined David Badre [13], Mark
D’Esposito [52] and Etienne Koechlin et al [102] and their colleagues, as actions are specified from
abstract plans to concrete responses, progressively posterior regions of lateral frontal cortex are
responsible for integrating more concrete information over more proximate time intervals. This
process of progressive articulation does not correspond to different stages of execution so much as
to how actions are selected, maintained and inhibited at multiple levels of abstraction [14]. The
panel on the right shows a simple neural-network model of the brain regions aligned with the rostro-
caudal axis of the frontal cortex and hypothesized to account for how action representations are
selected, maintained and inhibited at multiple levels of abstraction. The neural-network model
is described in more detail in the main text, but a few points are in order here: A — different
abstraction layers may include input from other sources, e.g., natural language embeddings, that
are only required at particular levels of abstraction; B — each recurrent level of the abstraction
hierarchy includes state variables encoding information that would typically appear on the call stack
in a conventional computer architecture; C — attentional layers mask (suppress) input that is not
determined to be relevant to decision making at a given time and level of abstraction resulting in a
sparse context vector.
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sensory and motor cortex as well as areas corresponding to higher-level abstractions located in the
frontal cortex responsible for abstract thought and subcortical regions responsible for motivation.
While not emphasized here, the active maintenance in working memory of information originating
from these sources is critical for the cognitive activities that these networks support [42, 75]. The
outputs are fed to a network (not shown) that serves as the interface for the peripheral motor
system (the fully instrumented integrated development environment (FIDE) in the case of the
programmer’s apprentice) which could play the role of the basal ganglia and cerebellum, but could
also be considerably simpler depending on the application.
Figure 13 is just a sketch employing familiar neural network components to make the point
that building these architectures out of standard components is not the most significant challenge.
The real challenge is in training them as part of larger system with lots of moving parts. The
expectation here, as in the model sketched in Figure 12, is that end-to-end training with stochastic
gradient descent isn’t going to work, and that training will likely require some form of layer-by-
layer developmentally-staged curriculum learning [147, 83, 22, 25] and a strategy for holding some
weights fixed while adjusting other weights to account for new information and avoid problems like
catastrophic forgetting.
3.5 Digital Assistants
We focus on automated programming for several reasons: deep neural networks have recently
demonstrated progress on automated code synthesis and program repair by leveraging existing
technologies; computers and, in particular, modern integrated development environments present a
rich alternative to the dominant simulation environments; programming is challenging for humans
and machines alike and we foresee opportunities to increase the productivity of software engineers.
That said, in this section we emphasize basic tools that enable the assistant to encode, represent
and manipulate fully differentiable programs.
The integrated development environment and its associated software engineering tools constitute
an extension of the apprentices capabilities in much the same way that a piano or violin extends a
musician or a prosthetic limb extends someone who has lost an arm or leg. The extension becomes
an integral part of the person possessing it and over time their brain creates a topographic map
that facilitates interacting with the extension.
As engineers designing the apprentice, part of our job is to create tools that enable the apprentice
to learn its trade and eventually become an expert. Conventional IDE tools simplify the job of
software engineers in designing software. The fully instrumented IDE (FIDE) that we engineer
for the apprentice will be integrated into the apprentices cognitive architecture so that tasks like
stepping a debugger or setting breakpoints are as easy for the apprentice as balancing parentheses
and checking for spelling errors in a text editor is for us.
As a first step in simplifying the use of FIDE for coding, the apprentice is designed to manipulate
programs as abstract syntax trees (AST) and easily move back and forth between the AST represen-
tation and the original source code in collaborating with the programmer. Both the apprentice and
the programmer can modify or make references to text appearing in the FIDE window by pointing
to items or highlighting regions of the source code. The text and AST versions of the programs
represented in the FIDE are automatically synchronized so that the program under development is
forced to adhere to certain syntactic invariants.
To support this hypothesis, we are developing distributed representations for programs that
enable the apprentice to efficiently search for solutions to programming problems by allowing the
apprentice to easily move back and forth between the two paradigms, exploiting both conventional
approaches to program synthesis and recent work on machine learning and inference in artificial neu-
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Figure 14: We use pointers to represent programs as abstract syntax trees and partition the NTM
memory, as in a conventional computer, into program memory and a LIFO execution (call) stack to
support recursion and reentrant procedure invocations, including call frames for return addresses,
local variable values and related parameters. The NTM controller manages the program counter
and LIFO call stack to simulate the execution of programs stored in program memory. Program
statements are represented as embedding vectors and the system learns to evaluate these represen-
tations in order to generate intermediate results that are also embeddings. It is a simple matter
to execute the corresponding code in the FIDE and incorporate any of the results as features in
embeddings.
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Figure 15: This slide illustrates how we make use of input / output pairs as program invariants to
narrow search for the next statement in the evolving target program. At any given moment the
call stack contains the trace of a single conditioned path through the developing program. A single
path is unlikely to provide sufficient information to account for the constraints implicit in all of the
sample input / output pairs and so we intend to use a limited lookahead planning system to sample
multiple execution traces in order to inform the prediction of the next program statement. These
so-called imagination-augmented agents implement a novel architecture for reinforcement learning
that balances exploration and exploitation using imperfect models to generate trajectories from
some initial state using actions sampled from a rollout policy [143, 180, 85, 81]. These trajectories
are then combined and fed to an output policy along with the action proposed by a model-free policy
to make better decisions. There are related reinforcement learning architectures that perform Monte
Carlo Markov chain search to apply and collect the constraints from multiple input / output pairs.
ral networks. Neural Turing Machines coupled with reinforcement learning are capable of learning
simple programs [78]. We are interested in representing structured programs expressed in mod-
ern programming languages. Our approach is to alter the NTM controller and impose additional
structure on the NTM memory designed to support procedural abstraction.
What could we do with such a representation? It is important to understand why we dont
work with some intermediate representation like bytecodes. By working in the target program-
ming language, we can take advantage of both the abstractions afforded by the language and the
expert knowledge of the programmer about how to exploit those abstractions. The apprentice is
bootstrapped with several statistical language models: one trained on a natural language corpus
and the other on a large code repository. Using these resources and the means of representing and
manipulating program embeddings, we intend to train the apprentice to predict the next expres-
sion in a partially constructed program by using a variant of imagination-based planning [143]. As
another example, we will attempt to leverage NLP methods to generate proposals for substituting
one program fragment for another as the basis for code completion.
The Differentiable Neural Program (DNP) representation and associated NTM controller for
managing the call stack and single-stepping through such programs allow us to exploit the ad-
vantages of distributed vector representations to predict the next statement in a program under
construction. This model makes it easy to take advantage of supplied natural language descriptions
and example input / output pairs plus incorporate semantic information in the form of execution
traces generated by utilizing the FIDE to evaluate each statement and encoding information about
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Figure 16: The above graphic illustrates how we might adapt the imagination-based planning (IBP)
for reinforcement learning framework [143] for use as the core of the apprentice code synthesis
module. Actions in this case correspond to transformations of the program under development.
States incorporate the history of the evolving partial program. Imagination consists of exploring
sequences of program transformations.
local variables on the stack.
The imagination-based planning (IBP) for reinforcement learning framework [143] serves as an
example for how the code synthesis module might be implemented. The IBP architecture combines
three separate adaptive components: (a) the controller + memory system which maps a state s ∈ S
and history h ∈ H to an action a ∈ A; (b) the manager maps a history h ∈ H to a route u ∈ U that
determines whether the system performs an action in the compute environment, e.g., single-step the
program in the FIDE, or performs an imagination step, e.g., generates a proposal for modifying the
existing code under construction; the imagination model is a form of dynamical systems model that
maps a pair consisting of a state s ∈ S and an action a ∈ A to an imagined next state s′ ∈ S and
scalar-valued reward r ∈ R.
The imagination model can be implemented as an interaction network [17] or using the graph-
networks framework [18, 158]. The three components are trained by three distinct, concurrent,
on-policy training loops. The IBP framework shown in Figure 16 allows code synthesis to alternate
between exploiting by modifying and running code, and exploring by using the model to investigate
and analyze what would happen if you actually did act. The manager chooses whether to execute
a command or predict (imagine) its result and can generate any number of trajectories to produce
a tree ht of imagined results. The controller takes this tree plus the compiled history and chooses
an action (command) to carry out in the FIDE.
3.6 End-to-End Systems
The subsections that comprise this section of the paper very roughly account for the functional
systems of the human brain. Admittedly perception is given short shrift and the systems that deal
with emotion and motivation are hardly mentioned at all, the former to save space and the latter
because it isn’t particularly relevant.
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In addition, there was no effort made to map the artificial neural networks described in this
section onto the biological subsystems discussed in Section 2. The goal was to demonstrate how
one might build systems that exhibit some desirable cognitive characteristics of human intelligence
by leveraging ideas from neuroscience.
The PBWM (prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, working memory) model described in [138, 90]
covers territory that we only sample from, but the PBWM was developed to explain the function of
biological brains, not selectively borrow ideas to extend the capabilities of artificial neural networks.
In a complete end-to-end architecture implementing the programmer’s apprentice, the three
subsystems described in this subsection would have to be integrated into different parts of the
action selection and executive control systems:
• The system in Figure 14 illustrates a differentiable procedural abstraction rich enough to sup-
port structured programming in a connectionist setting using standard embedding techniques
and memory networks [181, 44, 78, 79].
• The system in Figure 15 provides a sketch of how one might train a language model to predict
the next statement in a program under construction using input / output pairs or other
program invariants to constrain search [38, 178, 167, 53].
• The system in Figure 16 shows how a variation of imagination-based planning might be used to
train a network to predict the next program state using the embodied integrated development
environment as a source of ground truth [180, 143, 85].
Exactly how and where these components might be integrated into the overall architecture is
beyond the scope of this paper, but research on the neural correlates of mathematical reasoning
may provide some useful clues where to start [48, 50, 3].
4 Discussion
Training the models described in this paper is a daunting challenge, especially when you consider
that current deep neural network technologies rely heavily on large amounts of labeled data and
applications like the programmer’s apprentice are particularly vulnerable to catastrophic forgetting.
We believe training will require radically new approaches and that cognitive and developmental
neuroscience have much to offer in terms of insights drawn from the study of how humans learn.
4.1 Child Development
The human brain is organized as a 3-D structure in which specific cell types are positioned in a
radial, laminar and areal arrangement that depends on the production, specialization and directed
migration of cells from their origin in the embryo to their final destination [148]. It is only on
arriving at their final location that they establish connections to other cells. Postnatally laminar
and areal differentiation exhibit substantial differences between early (2-3 months) and late (7-12
months) infancy [128, 105]. Functional organization begins early (2-3 months) even as construction
continues and the shaping of cortical circuits reflects the consequences of increasingly complex
behavior.
All of this carefully orchestrated activity is critical to development. Early brain structures appear
as a consequence of the simple reflexive behaviors the infant engages in, laying the foundation
for more coordinated behavior depending on increasingly complex internal representations. The
infant’s ability to engage its environment broadens, exposing it to more complicated stimuli and
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the opportunity to experiment with new behaviors. The physical and social environment seem
to conspire to ensure that the growing infant and then adolescent has the necessary physical and
intellectual prerequisites in place when exposed to circumstances that require them. It may be that
we will find it useful to recapitulate some version of these developmental strategies for training
architectures patterned after the human brain.
4.2 Inductive Bias
Most AI systems are trained assuming what is essentially a blank slate in the form of random
weights and objective functions that do little to influence the specific content of what is actually
learned. In contrast, babies are born with an innate understanding of how objects move around
and interact with one another [51]. Before they can even crawl about on their own, they appear
to have an intuitive understanding of how space, time and number are interrelated [45, 87]. The
bodies, neural architectures, physical and social environments of mammals provide a strong induc-
tive bias in shaping their brains. Prolonged development plays a particularly important role in
humans. Most mammals can stand and move about within hours of being born. Many human
babies don’t walk until just under one year. However, human infants learn a great deal during this
early preperambulatory developmental period, much of it in preparation for subsequent stages of
development [115, 152].
It would be difficult if not impossible to genetically encode what a child learns during its lengthy
development. And so it seems plausible that evolution would select for a compact general inductive
bias enabling us to quickly acquire the basic skills we need to survive while retaining sufficient neural
plasticity so that we can adapt to changes during our lifetimes. The schedule of developmental
milestones necessary to learn these skills is highly conserved within our species and punctuated by
profound changes in the architecture of the brain.
At birth, the architectural foundations are in place to construct the adult brain. For each
subsequent developmental milestone, our genes turn on the specific cellular machinery necessary
to construct scaffolding, guide neurons of the right cell types to their terminal locations, extend
axonal and dendritic processes, eliminate unnecessary neurons and establish new or prune existing
synaptic connections. The innate inductive bias and training curriculum implicit in development
influence two critical factors that determine human intelligence: First, they serve to initialize the
mapping from body to latent state representations throughout the cortex thereby grounding experi-
ence in the physical environment. Second, they utilize this grounding as the basis for all subsequent
understanding, concrete and abstract.
This basis provides a template or prototype for representing new concepts, whether they be pre-
dictive models that allow us to interact with complex dynamical systems or composite categorical
representations that enable us to recognize, contrast and compare instances of a particular class of
entities [153, 154, 173]. In designing architectures to accommodate learning such representations,
recent work on learning relational models that characterize different classes of entities, the rela-
tionships they participate in and the rules employed in composing them to form new relationships
seems particularly promising [158, 84, 159, 17]. This core competency should also serve as the
starting point for reasoning about all sorts of abstract entities including computer programs and
mathematical objects.
4.3 Natural Language
The use of language and, more generally, symbolic reasoning is an important if not defining char-
acteristic of human intelligence. Some cognitive scientists, including such outspoken proponents as
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Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, view symbolic representations that exhibit combinatorial syntac-
tic and semantic structure as candidates for a language of thought, and view connectionist proposals
as lacking these properties and serving primarily as an account of the neural structures in which
symbolic representations are implemented [62, 61]. O’Reilly et al [142] have attempted to reconcile
the symbolic and connectionist views, arguing that the two are complementary and that parts of
the brain exhibit properties of both symbolic and connectionist information processing.
The evolutionary biologist, Terrence Deacon, argues that our use of language is not a direct
consequence of natural selection but rather the result of a collective effort involving millions of
human beings working over thousands of year to produce an encyclopedic record of human endeavor
to pass down to future generations [46]. It is hard to imagine an effective programmer’s apprentice,
much less an accomplished software engineer, lacking the ability to communicate in natural language
or denied access to the written word. Recent progress in grounding language learning in an agent’s
experience interacting with a suitably complex environment bodes well for applications like the
programmer’s apprentice. For these reasons and more, we see the rich complexity of collaborative
pair programming as a compelling framework for exploring human-level AI.
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